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The Emerging Bad Faith Cause of
Action Takes on the Exclusive
Remedy Doctrine
by Robert R. Potter*
and
Joan T.A. Gabel**
No perfect rule is possible, so the decisive question is what rule has the
fewest flaws. From this it follows that the great secret for success of
the workers' compensation system lay not in its vaunted, coercive
original compulsion, but in the fact that it followed the very pattern of
risk distribution that both historical experience and general theory of
contract law indicated would best minimize the risks in question.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Georgia Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act")2 and the related
regulations establish a system of comprehensive medical coverage and
income benefits for employees who suffer work-related injuries. Workers'
compensation is a statutory scheme that grants the injured employee a
sure remedy of scheduled income benefits and medical coverage without
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J.D., magna cum laude, 1977). Member Mercer Law Review 1975-1977; Editor-in-Chief,
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** Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Department of Risk Management and
Insurance, Georgia State University. Haverford College (B.A., 1988); University of Georgia
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contributions to this project.
1. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 805 (1982).
2. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 to -421 (1992 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter the Act].
*
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regard to fault; in exchange, the employer and insurer escape the high
costs of litigation and the threat of compensatory and punitive damages.' Under this quid pro quo, employees injured at work have as their
exclusive remedy the workers' compensation system, thereby giving rise
to the "exclusive remedy doctrine."4 The integrity of the exclusive
remedy doctrine is the key to maintaining a fundamentally sound and
equitable workers' compensation system.5 The exclusive remedy
doctrine, however, is facing a formidable challenge in Georgia. In Zurich
American Insurance Co. v. Dicks,' the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that a physical injury caused by willful and wanton cessation of workers'
compensation benefits circumvents the exclusive remedy doctrine and
gives rise to a tort action.7 The court found that a new or exacerbated
physical injury that arises from the actions of the insurer is outside the
scope of the Workers' Compensation Act.' This ruling enables similarly
situated plaintiffs to pursue recovery through the workers' compensation
system and through traditional civil litigation. The holding in Dicks
exposes employers and insurers to the very risk the quid pro quo
originally prevented: compensatory and punitive damages. 9
The Georgia Supreme Court now has the opportunity to examine the
Dicks ruling. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified the
following question in the case of Doss v. Food Lion, Inc.:1
Does Georgia law recognize an independent cause of action apart from
any remedy available under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act
where an employer and/or insurer has intentionally delayed authorizing medical treatment to which an employee is entitled under the Act
and where
such delay has exacerbated a work-related physical
11
injury?
This Article explores the question presented in Doss by giving the
historical context in which courts evaluate the exclusive remedy

3.

JAMEs B. HIERS & ROBERT R. POTTER, GEORGIA WoRKERS COMPENSATION-LAW AND

PRACTICE §§

4.

1-1 to -2 (2d ed. 1988).

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992).

5. Epstein, supra note 1, at 818; Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an
Employee's Workers' CompensationRemedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405,
411-12 (1988).
6. 220 Ga. App. 725, 470 S.E.2d 279 (1996).
7. Id. at 728, 470 S.E.2d at 281.
8. Id.
9. Because the Georgia rules of civil procedure forbid it, no appeal stemmed from the
Zurich decision because the court of appeals reached its decision on summary judgment.
GA. SuP. CT. R. 30 (1996). See analysis section for more discussion.

10. 83 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996).
11. Id. at 380.
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doctrine. That perspective is then used to evaluate the ruling in Dicks.
The Article examines the justification for re-establishing the integrity of
the exclusive remedy doctrine in light of the historic rationale for the
workers' compensation system. After building a foundation in precedent
and policy, the Article argues that the exclusive remedy doctrine should
remain intact as the very cornerstone of the workers' compensation
system.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The American Workers' Compensation System
Generally, workers in nineteenth century America did not bring
lawsuits against their employers for injuries sustained on the job.12 A
prevailing fear of unemployment kept most employees from ever
testifying against their employers. 3 Also, during this time, employers'
most reliable legal defenses-assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
and negligence of a fellow employee-became strong precedent for
insulating employers.' 4 By the end of the nineteenth century, employees' decreasing remedies in work-related tort litigation gained the
attention of many state legislators. 5 As industrial growth brought
corresponding increases in industrial accidents,'" legislators searched
for answers. The German compensation system enacted in 189317 and
the English Employers' Liability Act of 1880 provided new frameworks
for the compensation of employees.'8 Despite the popularity of these
foreign solutions, the first American compensation act, which was passed
by Maryland in 1902, was struck down as unconstitutional. 19 State

A.

12. Dana M. Leonard, Comment, Exclusivity Provisions of Workers' Compensation
Statutes: Will the DualInjury PrincipleCrack the Wall ofEmployer Immunity?, 55 U. CIN.
L. REV. 549, 550 (1986).
13. Id.
14. HIERS & POTTER, supra note 3, at § 1-1.
15.

ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT

§ 5.20 (1984).
16. Id. An estimated 70% to 94% of all industrial accidents went uncompensated before
workers' compensation legislation reached the United States. King, supra note 5, at 415.
17. An account of this system was published as a Special Report of the U.S.
Commissioner of Labor in 1893. LARSON, supra note 15, at § 5.20.
18. Epstein, supra note 1, at 818. The English Employer's Liability Act of 1880 became
a model for many state legislatures in the United States. Id. at 787.
19. A narrow cooperative accident fund for miners passed in Maryland in 1902.
LARSON, supra note 15, at § 5.20.
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courts struck down other state compensation laws on the same
grounds:2" imposing liability on employers without fault amounted to
a taking of property without due process of law under state and federal
constitutions," The fear of a court finding of unconstitutionality
caused state legislatures to pass less comprehensive and noncompulsory
acts.22 But in a landmark decision in 1917, the United States Supreme
23
Court upheld a New York compulsory workers' compensation statute.
The explosion of American workers' compensation law began soon
thereafter. In 1920 Georgia adopted its first workers' compensation
legislation.24
Workers' compensation in the United States is a unique system that
cannot be categorized under tort law or social insurance. 25 The
underlying premise of the quid pro quo is that the costs of industrial
accidents and diseases "should, like other costs of doing business, be
borne by the enterprise that engendered them,"' and ultimately by the
consumer.2 1 Workers' compensation creates a contractual relationship
between employers and employees in which benefits are shared "in ways
that maximize their joint profits and use price adjustments to match the
residual risks assigned to each party."8 The combination of the
employers' strict liability and the employees'
limited damages acts as a
29
prearranged settlement for future claims.
The amount of compensation injured workers receive under the system
certainly may leave employees in a worse position than if they had never
been injured,30 but the benefits afforded under workers' compensation
go beyond the actual dollar payments. Employees enjoy guaranteed
recovery of benefits for injuries that fall within the statute regardless of
fault.3 Additionally, the relatively low cost of the system to employers
renders them able to hire and retain more workers.3 2 It is much more

20. The Montana Workers' Compensation Statute, 1909 Mont. Laws 67, was struck
down in 1909. A New York act, 1910 N.Y. Laws 674, was struck down in 1911.
21. LARSON, supra note 15, at § 5.20.
22. Id.
23. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
24. 1920 Ga. Laws 167.
25. LARSON, supra note 15, at § 1.20.
26.

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 89,

at

573 (5th ed. 1984).
LARSON, supra note 15, at § 2.20.
28. Epstein, supra note 1, at 804.
29. Id.
30. LARSON, supra note 15, at § 2.50.
31. Epstein, supra note 1, at 800.
32. Id. at 800-01. Commentators maintain that employers benefit from the tempered
compensation to injured employees because it gives employees little incentive to feign
27.
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profitable for the employee to work than to not work and collect
benefits.33 Although employees and employers enjoy independent
benefits, the goal of the system is to benefit both parties by replacing
uncertain remedies with certain ones and to avoid the expenses and
risks of tort litigation.34
Accomplishing the goal of certainty of benefits depends squarely on the
integrity of the exclusive remedy doctrine in workers' compensation
statutes.35 The exclusive remedy doctrine limits the injured workers'
recovery to that provided by the workers' compensation statute. The
elimination of common law actions takes the guesswork out of remedies
and "prevent[s] litigation from becoming a grotesque imitation of global
war."3" If employees could bring their employer or their employer's
insurance carrier into court claiming a separate tort action for every
injury or subsequent delay in payments, the workers' compensation
system would disintegrate.37
Workers' Compensation in Georgia
In Georgia, the exclusive remedy doctrine of the Georgia Workers'
Compensation Act limits the rights and remedies afforded an employee
injured on the job." The Act states that "[tihe rights and remedies
granted to an employee by this chapter shall exclude all other rights and
B.

remedies of such employee ...

at common law or otherwise, on account

of such injury, loss of service, or death."39
Employees can avoid the exclusive remedy doctrine by proving their
injury is not within the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act.4 °

injury. Rather, there are incentives for employees to be cautious in the workplace and to
mitigate their damages. Id.
33. King, supra note 5, at 414.
34. Epstein, supra note 1, at 818.
35. Although workers' compensation is threatened in many jurisdictions by judicial
expansion of the definition of "compensable injury" and expanded awards by legislatures,
Epstein, supra note 1, at 809, the most lethal threat to workers' compensation is the
weakening of the exclusive remedy doctrine. Epstein, supra note 1, at 818.
36. Epstein, supra note 1, at 818.
37. Wendell J. Kiser, Bad FaithHandlingof Workers' CompensationCases:Can it Give
Rise to a SeparateTort Action Against Employers, Carriers,or Self-Insureds?, 23 TORT &
INS. L.J. 147, 160 (1987-88).
38. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992).
39. Id. § 34-9-11(a). Note that Georgia law extends the limited liability of an employer

to the employer's insurer. Id. § 34-9-1(3).
40. This point is not completely settled. CompareCovington v. Berkeley Granite Corp.,

183 Ga. 801, 807, 190 S.E.2d 8, 11 (1937) (holding that claims which do not fall within the
Act are not contemplated by the exclusivity provision) with Nowell v. Stone Mountain
Scenic R.R., 150 Ga. App. 325, 257 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1979) (holding that even injuries not
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Indeed, the bulk of workers' compensation litigation concerns determinations of whether injuries "arose out of employment, and were suffered in
the course of employment."4 The difficult question confronting the
Georgia courts is whether an employee whose original injury is clearly
within the statute can nonetheless elude the doctrine of exclusivity in
order to pursue tort benefits as well as receive workers' compensation
benefits.
The seminal case in Georgia addressing this question is Bright v.
Nimmo. 42 In Bright, the employee suffered an on-the-job injury and
received benefits by order of the Workers' Compensation Board. His
employer and his employer's insurer filed an untimely controversion of
the claim in violation of the Act. In the interim, the employee did not
receive payments and ultimately suffered financial injury and foreclosure
on his house. Pursuant to the remedy for delay provided in the Act,43
the Board awarded the employee attorney fees and a fifteen percent
penalty. The employee subsequently brought suit in tort against the
employer and insurer for willful and intentional delay in payment that
resulted in his financial injury."
The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and
insurer on the grounds that the employee had his exclusive remedy
under Georgia's Workers' Compensation Act.45 The plaintiff appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit, which certified the question of whether Georgia
law recognizes an independent cause of action for alleged intentional
delay of workers' compensation payments. Noting that any delay in
payment by a solvent payor is willful and intentional, the Georgia
Supreme Court answered in the negative. 4' The court held that "where

compensable under the Act can still be within the purview of the Act for purposes of the
exclusivity provision).
41. See, e.g., Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992)
(holding that the exclusive remedy provision applies to intentional acts of the employer as
long as the injury arises out of employment); Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 Ga. App.
703, 434 S.E.2d 500 (1993) (holding that slander suffered at work is not covered by the
statute and is not subject to the exclusive remedy provision); Cline v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 137 Ga. App. 76, 223 S.E.2d 14 (1975) (holding that injuries resulting from fraud
do not fall within the Act and are not subject to the exclusive remedy provision); Murphy
v. ARA Servs., Inc., 164 Ga. App. 859, 298 S.E.2d 528 (1982) and Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga.
App. 888,303 S.E.2d 71 (1983) (both holding that sexual harassment is not within the Act).
42. 253 Ga. 378, 320 S.E.2d 365 (1984).
43. The portion of the Act that provides remedies for delayed payments is now O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-221(e).
44. 253 Ga. at 378, 320 S.E.2d at 366.

45. Id. at 379, 320 S.E.2d at 366.
46. Id. at 381, 320 S.E.2d at 368.
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the Workers' Compensation Act provides penalties for delay, such
penalties exclude the employee's use of common law remedies."47
Bright controlled this issue until the Georgia Court of Appeals heard
the unique case of Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Roberts." In Roberts the
employee received workers' compensation benefits until she terminated
her employment and moved to Florida. The employee returned to
Georgia to obtain authorized treatment because the employer/insurer
refused to authorize additional medical treatment in Florida. She then
filed suit, alleging that the employer/insurer failed to authorize
necessary treatment, conspired against her, and hid the truth of her
condition from her, resulting in her complete disability. The employer
and insurer failed to answer the complaint and suffered a default
judgment.49
On appeal, the employer and insurer argued that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because the case involved a workers' compensation issue.' °
The appellate court found that the trial court had jurisdiction over the
matter and affirmed the lower court's judgment.5 The court reasoned
that the exclusive remedy provision did not apply because the employee
alleged intentional 52physical injury rather than intentional financial
injury as in Bright.
The court of appeals re-addressed the distinction between physical and
financial injuries in Dutton v. Georgia Associated General Contractor
Self-Insurers Trust Fund.5" In Dutton the employee began to receive
workers' compensation benefits from the employer/insurer after an onthe-job injury. Seventeen months later, the employer/insurer began to
question its obligation to pay for certain medical bills and a rental car,
and discontinued payments. The employee brought a conspiratorial tort
action seeking back payments, damages for further injuries suffered as
a result of nonpayment, and punitive damages. The trial court
dismissed the claim. On appeal, the employee argued that Roberts
authorized a claim at common law while the employer/insurer pled the
exclusive remedy doctrine. In affirming the lower court's dismissal, the
court declared the case controlled not by Roberts but by Bright.54 The
court emphasized that the facts established in Roberts were that the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

253 Ga. at 381, 320 S.E.2d at 368.
196 Ga. App. 618, 396 S.E.2d 787 (1990).
Id. at 619, 396 S.E.2d at 788.
Id. at 620, 396 S.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 622, 396 S.E.2d at 790.
Id. at 620-21, 396 S.E.2d at 789.
215 Ga. App. 607, 451 S.E.2d 504 (1994).
Id. at 608, 451 S.E.2d at 506.
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employee suffered a physical injury which was caused by the intentional
refusal to authorize necessary treatment. 55 The court appeared to
validate the distinction but deemed the instant facts to be more
analogous to Bright.56
After Dutton Georgia courts seemed to recognize two categories of bad
faith workers' compensation claims: (1) claims that allege additional
physical injury caused by tortious acts, and; (2) claims that allege
financial injury, for which the exclusive remedy may be found within the
workers' compensation system. It was not until 1995 in Zurich
American Insurance Co. v. Dicks57 that the Georgia Court of Appeals
made that distinction unmistakable.
III.

ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE Co. v. DICKS AND Doss v. FOOD
LION, INC.

A.

Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Dicks
June Dicks suffered an on-the-job injury which left her unable to
work."8 The workers' compensation insurance carrier accepted the
claim and authorized medical care.59 During the course of Ms. Dicks'
treatment, the insurance carrier arranged an independent medical
examination ("IME") with another doctor. The IME physician concluded
that the employee "should be either terminated from her job or put in a
work hardening program where she can get back to work.' ° Based on
this report, the insurer suspended Ms. Dicks' medical benefits, and her
employer terminated her employment. Ms. Dicks was undergoing
physical therapy treatment when the insurer suspended her medical
benefits. 61
Following the suspension, Ms. Dicks requested a workers' compensation hearing seeking attorney fees and recommencement of her benefits.
The administrative law judge ordered the insurer to reinstate benefits
effective from the date of suspension.6 2 The administrative law judge
also found that the employer/insurer's defense of the claim was
unreasonable and assessed attorney fees.'

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id., 451 S.E.2d at 505.
Id., 451 S.E.2d at 506.
220 Ga. App. 725, 470 S.E.2d 279 (1996).
Id. at 726, 470 S.E.2d at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Ms. Dicks subsequently sued the employer/insurer in tort, alleging
that the insurance carrier intentionally and wrongfully terminated her
medical benefits, thereby aggravating her injuries."4 She introduced
testimony from a physician indicating that the delay in her physical
therapy "exacerbated [her] medical condition, greatly worsened her
symptoms, adversely affected her ability to be rehabilitated, caused
additional pain behavior and substantially affected her permanent
impairment rating."6 5 The employer/insurer moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the exclusive remedy doctrine barred the
employee's tort complaint. After the superior court denied the motion,
the employer/insurer appealed.66
The Georgia Court of Appeals cited Bright v. Nimmo67 for the
proposition that the intentional delay of workers' compensation
payments does not give rise to an independent cause of action against
the employer or its insurer for financial injury." The court in Dicks
noted, however, that Bright expressly left open the question of whether
the employee could recover in tort for an intentional physical injury by
the employer. s The Georgia Court of Appeals held that this distinction
allowed a separate tort action only if the plaintiff could prove that the
bad faith
delay of workers' compensation payments caused a physical
70
injury.
The court in Dicks found that the Workers' Compensation Act does not
contemplate a separate physical injury flowing from a bad faith refusal
to provide benefits.7 According to the majority opinion, a new or
exacerbated physical injury could not be connected to the employment

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 253 Ga. 378, 320 S.E.2d 365 (1984).
68. 220 Ga. App. at 726, 470 S.E.2d 279 (citing Bright, 253 Ga. at 381, 470 S.E.2d at
368).
69. Id. at 728, 470 S.E.2d at 281.
70. Id. To support the holding, the court cites Jim Walter Homes v. Roberts, 196 Ga.
App. 618, 396 S.E.2d 787 (1990). Id. at 726, 470 S.E.2d at 279. The court notes that the
issue was previously addressed in Dutton v. Georgia Associated Gen. Contractor SelfInsurers Trust Fund, 215 Ga. App. 607, 451 S.E.2d 504 (1994). Id. at 728, 470 S.E.2d at
281.
71. Dicks, 220 Ga. App. at 728, 470 S.E.2d at 281. The Georgia General Assembly,
however, has addressed the issue of separate physical injury flowing from medical
malpractice. In the context of medical malpractice, the employee can sue the doctor, but
the employer/insurer remains insulated from tort damages. The injury resulting from the
malpractice is deemed part of the work-related injury, thereby obligating the employer and
insurer solely for compensation provided by the Act. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203.

72
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relationship, thereby removing the injury from the Act's purview.72
Rather, the injury stemmed from the actions of the employer/insurer as
a source outside of the employer/employee relationship.7" The majority
denied the motion for summary judgment and held that to conclude
otherwise would leave the employee without a legal remedy.74
A three-judge minority fundamentally disagreed. In their dissent, the
judges relied on Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Davis. 5 The court in
Davis established that "[tihe intentional delay of Workers' Compensation
payments does not give rise to an independent cause of action against
the employer or its insurer where penalties for such delay are provided
by the [Workers' Compensation Alct."7s The dissent then noted that
the Act provides for the assessment of attorney fees and penalties for
unreasonable delay in payment of benefits.77 According to the dissent,
this is a remedy within the Act that, under
78 Davis, engages the exclusive
remedy doctrine and bars a tort claim.
Because of new Georgia Supreme Court rules prohibiting review of a
case where the appellate court has affirmed a trial court's denial of a
motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals has had the last
word.79 The Dicks factual situation will now be presented to a jury to
determine whether the employer/insurer intentionally and wrongfully

72. Dicks, 220 Ga. App. at 728, 470 S.E.2d at 281.

73. Id.
74. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 281-82.
75. 253 Ga. 376, 320 S.E.2d 368 (1984).
76. Id. at 377, 320 S.E.2d at 370 (citing Bright, 238 Ga. at 381, 320 S.E.2d at 365).
77. Dicks, 220 Ga. App. at 729,470 S.E.2d at 282 (Ruffin, J., dissenting). Not only can

the State Board assess attorney fees, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1), it can appoint physicians,
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-101, order a change of physicians, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201, assess a penalty
of up to 20% of the amount of any medical expense that is not paid within 60 days,
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c), or assess a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per violation for
intentionally making any false or misleading representation for the purpose of "obtaining
or denying of any benefit" under the Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-18(b). Any enhanced physical
problems that result in increased disability would warrant a corresponding increase in total
disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or both. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-261-63.
Finally, in the worst example of an intentional wrong, death benefits can be increased by

20% for the employee's dependents when the employee's death "was the direct result of an
injury proximately caused by the intentional act of the employer with specific intent to
cause such injury." O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265(e).
The death benefits provision also specifically refers to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11, Georgia's
exclusive remedy provision. Because of this specific reference, it is conceivable that under

Dicks, an employee who dies at the hands of bad faith would have as his sole recourse the
workers' compensation system, while one who lives can sue in tort.
78. 220 Ga. App. at 729, 470 S.E.2d at 282 (Ruffin, J., dissenting). The dissent left the
sufficiency of that remedy to the legislature. Id. at 730, 470 S.E.2d at 282-83.
79. GA. Sup. CT. R. 40 (1996).
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terminated the employee's benefits and, moreover, whether this alleged
misconduct caused Ms. Dicks any physical injury. The Georgia Supreme
Court will nonetheless address the legal issue in Dicks in Doss v. Food
Lion, Inc.8"
B.

Doss v. Food Lion, Inc.
Eric Doss suffered injuries when a 2.5 pound box of chocolates thrown
by a co-worker struck his head. The self-insured employer paid all of
Mr. Doss' medical bills but controverted payments for psychological
treatment. The administrative law judge granted Mr. Doss' request for
psychological treatment but did not assess attorney fees or penalties. 8'
Mr. Doss then moved to Louisiana and started treatment with local
doctors. Another dispute arose over payments for medical treatment.
During this disagreement, Mr. Doss did not receive allegedly necessary
in-patient rehabilitation. He maintains that the delay in authorizing the
rehabilitation occurred in bad faith and that his condition worsened as
a result, causing a new physical injury. He filed a diversity claim in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
alleging bad faith and seeking compensatory and punitive damages."2
The self-insured employer filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that the exclusive remedy doctrine barred the tort claim. The
judge held that a cause of action could exist and allowed the claim to go
to trial. 83 The employer/self-insurer appealed to the Eleventh Circuit,
which has certified the same question to the Georgia Supreme Court
that the court of appeals decided in Dicks: Does an independent cause
of action exist for bad faith delay in authorizing medical treatment
resulting in physical injury? 4
III.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

While the Dicks and Doss decisions present cases of first impression
in Georgia, the question of bad faith has already arisen in many other
states.8 8 The erosion of the exclusive remedy doctrine in other states

80. 83 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996).
81. Id. at 378.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 379. The judge relied on Roberts, 196 Ga. App. 618, 396 S.E.2d 787, and
Maulden v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 824 F. Supp. 212 (S.D. Ga. 1992).
84. Doss, 83 F.3d at 380. For in-depth discussions of bad faith claims in the workers'
compensation setting nationwide, see Kiser, supra note 37, and Vivian Senungetuk,
Workers' CompensationExclusivity: Is it Here or is it Gone? 58 DEF. COUNS. J. 526 (1991).
85. See jurisdictions listed infra notes 89-92, 94.
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is due in part to the weakening of employers' legal defenses"6 and in
part to the increasing attractiveness of tort remedies compared to
compensation payments.8 7 States that allow independent causes of
action for bad faith usually do so in the spirit of opening alternative
forums to the injured claimant.8 8 A handful of states simply have ruled
that bad faith claims are independent actions that are not subject to the
exclusivity provisions of their respective workers' compensation acts.8 9
Other states have allowed independent bad faith claims only where the
insurer's conduct has been malicious, outrageous, or deceitful.9 0 Still
others have affirmatively declared that workers' compensation insurers
have a duty of good faith in handling claims, the breach of which is not
controlled by the exclusive remedy doctrine.9 At least two states have

86. Many states have adopted comparative negligence over contributory negligence.
Assumption of risk is often destroyed as a defense if the risk was created by the employer,
or if the risk was a known or extraordinary one. The fellow servant doctrine has been
weakened as well. LARSON, supra note 15, at § 4.50.
87. Kiser, supra note 37, at 159.
88. Senungetuk, supra note 84, at 526.
89. See, e.g., Leathers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 500 So. 2d 451 (Miss. 1986);
Birkenbuel v. Montana State Comp. Ins. Fund, 687 P.2d 700 (Mont. 1984); Russell v.
Protective Ins. Co., 751 P.2d 693 (N.M. 1988) (recognizing bad faith as an independent
cause of action only for refusal to pay); Kuney v. PMA Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 1009 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (allowing a bad faith claim against the insurer because the insurer has a separate
relationship with the claimant from the employer); Matter of Cert. a Question of Law, 399
N.W.2d 320, 321 (S.D. 1987) (allowing a bad faith claim because the injury was separate
from the original industrial injury); Coleman v. American Univ. Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220
(Wisc. 1979) (holding that a claim for bad faith in a settlement proceeding is not within the
act).
90. See, e.g., Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063 (Cal. App. 1971) (allowing bad
faith claim for insurer's gross deceitful behavior in the handling of a claim); Ledingham v.
Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 330 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. 1975), rev'd on othergrounds,
356 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 1976) (allowing a bad faith claim where insurer's conduct was outrageous); Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978) (allowing a bad
faith claim for malicious intent for delay payments); Hastings v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
404 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. App. 1987) (allowing a bad faith claim for insurer's outrageous and
extreme conduct); Deeter v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 747 P.2d 1103 (Wash. App. 1987)
(allowing bad faith claim where a self-insurer's conduct exceeded all reasonable bounds of
reasonable administrative procedure).
91. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985) (holding insurer's
duty of good faith was breached by a negligent delay in payments); Correa v. Pennsylvania
Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 618 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1985) (holding that insurer has duty of good
faith where claimant suffers intentional infliction of emotional distress). Delaware deems
bad faith actions by employers before the injury within the exclusive jurisdiction of the act,
but bad faith after the injury can give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress ("IIED") only. Kofran v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 441 A.2d 226 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982);
Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (1988).
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indicated that they might recognize bad faith tort actions but have not
yet seen facts that would compel them to do so.9
States that exclude bad faith claims brought outside of the system
expressly intend to preserve the integrity of their workers' compensation
acts.93 A number of states have disallowed independent claims of bad
faith against insurers and have placed them squarely within the
jurisdiction of the workers' compensation system as the exclusive source
of redress. 4 A few states have provided specific statutory remedies for
the willful and intentional delay of payment.95 Indeed, it is difficult to
delineate specific trends because the states have taken such varied
positions on this issue. Ultimately, the answers to the dilemma
currently faced by the Georgia Supreme Court lie in Georgia's own case
history.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Problem with Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Dicks
The court of appeals in Dicks offers no guidance on what constitutes
the bad faith 96 necessary to escape the exclusive remedy doctrine. The
court also does not address how recognizing the bad faith cause of action
will undermine the exclusive remedy doctrine and impact the workers'
compensation system as a whole. Instead, the court in Dicks relied
exclusively on Georgia's historical distinction between physical and
financial injury.97 But regardless of what "bad faith" is or the injury

A.

92. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 712 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1986); Burlew v. Am. Mut.

Ins. Co., 472 N.E.2d 682 (N.Y. 1984) (holding a claim for IIED could lie against the insurer
with more compelling facts).
93. Senungetuk, supra note 84, at 526.
94. See, e.g., Wilkins v. W. Point-Pepperell, Inc., 397 So. 2d 115, 117-18 (Ala. 1981)
(stating the court has no authority to create an exception to the impenetrable exclusive
remedy provision); Sandoval v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 571
P.2d 706 (Ariz. App. 1977) (noting that wrongful deprivation of benefits is the only tort
claim barred); Cain v. National Union Life Ins. Co., 718 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 1986); Old
Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Jones v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Horman v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 837 (Kan. 1984); Cook v. Mack's Transfer & Storage, 355
S.E.2d 861 (S.C. 1987), affg 352 S.E.2d 296 (S.C. App. 1986).
95. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.34 (West 1991) (amended 1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-540 (Law Co-op. 1985).
96. Bad faith is "a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill
some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's
rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127
(6th ed. 1990).
97. 220 Ga. App. 725, 470 S.E.2d 279 (1996).
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resulting therefrom, the remedy should fall within the workers'
compensation system.
The court in Dicks divided its analysis into two sections: (1) recognizing a distinction between physical and financial injuries due to bad faith,
and; (2) finding no penalty within the Workers' Compensation Act for a
physical injury.

1. There Is No Logical Distinction Between Financial and
Physical Injuries Resulting from Delayed Payments. The Georgia
Court of Appeals relied heavily on the supreme court's ruling in
Bright9" to draw a distinction between recovery in tort for financial or
physical injury at the hands of bad faith.9 The court in Bright noted
that the facts indicated only a financial injury caused by the bad faith
delay. The question as certified, however, addresses the bad faith delay
in payment of benefits-not the nature of the injury resulting therefrom. 1'0 Maintenance of the financial/physical injury distinction will
inevitably lead to confusion when an employee who suffers both physical
and financial injury due to bad faith must file two claims to recover-one
through the workers' compensation system and one in the traditional
courts.101

0 2 in support of the same
The court in Dicks also looks to Roberts"
distinction. The court in Roberts relied upon two sexual harassment
cases0 3 that allowed a cause of action outside the workers' compensation
system."° The decisions recognizing that sexual harassment is not an
injury as contemplated by the legislature merely confirmed the already

98. 253 Ga. 378, 320 S.E.2d 365 (1984).
99. For a discussion of the decision in Bright, see supra part II, B.
100. Doss, 83 F.3d at 380.
101. Edward J. Main, Bad Faith in the Workers' Compensation Context: A Cause in
Search of an Action, 30 TULSA L.J. 507, 514 (1995).
The same course of conduct should give rise to but one claim actionable in but one
court. If the conduct is the subject of proceedings before the Workers' Compensation Court, that court would have exclusive jurisdiction until and unless the
statutory steps are taken for making such an order enforceable in some other
Court. Id.
To rely on the distinction between physical and financial injury in Doss would improperly
narrow the Eleventh Circuit's question.
102. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Roberts, 196 Ga. App. 618, 396 S.E.2d 787 (1990). For
a thorough discussion of Roberts, see supra part II,B.
103. Murphy v. ARA Servs., 164 Ga. App. 859, 298 S.E.2d 528 (1982); Cox. v. Brazo,
165 Ga. App. 888, 303 S.E.2d 71 (1983).
104. The courts found that sexual harassment is not an "injury" as contemplated by the
Act. "'Injury' or 'personal injury' means only injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of employment." O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (1992).
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obvious distinction between discrimination and workers' compensation.
Using sexual harassment as precedent is inappropriate in light of the
clear line between Title VII injuries and injuries directly related to a
compensable claim. Neither sexual harassment case involved a claim for
physical injuries resulting from an intentional delay of payments for an
Therefore, the
already-accepted workers' compensation injury. 5
court's reliance on Roberts to support the distinction between physical
and financial injury is misplaced.
2. The Workers' Compensation Act Provides a Remedy for
Intentional Delay of Medical Treatment. The key to the Roberts
ruling was a finding that the Workers' Compensation Act does not
provide a remedy for worsening of a physical condition attributable to a
bad faith delay in medical payments."° This presents a fundamental
flaw in Roberts and the cases, including Dicks, which rely upon it. 10 7
Not only can the State Board assess attorney fees, 08 it can appoint
physicians,"° order a change of physicians,"0 assess a penalty of up
to twenty percent of the amount of any medical expense that is not paid
within sixty days,' or assess a civil penalty of up to ten thousand
dollars per violation for intentionally making any false or misleading
representation for the purpose of "the obtaining or denying of any
benefit" under the Act." 2 Any enhanced physical problems that result
in increased disability would warrant a corresponding increase in total
disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or both."3
Finally, in the worst example of an intentional wrong, death benefits can
be increased by twenty percent for the employee's dependents when the
employee's death "was the direct result of an injury proximately caused

105. See Dicks, 220 Ga. App. at 727, 470 S.E.2d at 281.
106. See Roberts, 196 Ga. App. at 620, 396 S.E.2d at 789. See also Maulden 824 F.
Supp. at 215.
107. The court in Dicks states that regardless of whether an injury is physical or
financial, "where the [Workers' Compensation] Act provides a penalty for delayed benefit
payments, a claim based on the delay is barred by the exclusive remedy provision." Dicks,

220 Ga. App. at 726, 470 S.E.2d at 279. The majority then finds that there is no remedy
within the Workers' Compensation Act for physical injury, while financial injuries are
redressed by penalties and attorney fee provisions. Id. at 728, 470 S.E.2d at 281. See
O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-108 and 221(e).
108. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1) (1992).
109. Id. § 34-9-101.

110. Id. § 34-9-201(c) (Supp. 1996).
111. Id. § 34-9-203(c).
112. Id. § 34-9-18(b).
113. Id. §§ 34-9-261-63 (1992 & Supp. 1996).
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by the intentional
act of the employer with the specific intent to cause
14

such injury."
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Davis,"5 the Georgia Supreme
Court stated:
the intentional delay of workers' compensation payments does not give
rise to an independent cause of action against the employer or its
insurer where penalties for such delay are provided by the [Workers'
Compensation Aict. That is to say, where the Workers' Compensation
Act provides penalties for delay, such penalties exclude the employee's
use of common law remedies."'

The dissent in Dicks relied on Davis in stating that regardless of the
type of injury suffered, if the claim is based on an intentional and
unreasonable delay in payment, the Workers' Compensation Act provides
a penalty in the form of assessed fees and penalties. 117 While the
dissent sympathized with Ms. Dicks, it recognized that the role of the
judiciary is not to enlarge existing statutory sanctions. Rather, any such
enlargement is for the General Assembly."'

114. Id. § 34-9-265(e) (1992).
115. 253 Ga. 376, 320 S.E.2d 368 (1984).
116. 253 Ga. at 376, 320 S.E.2d at 370 (citing Bright, 283 Ga. at 381, 320 S.E.2d at
368). The court in Davis considered and declined to adopt decisions of jurisdictions that
found an intentional delay gives rise to an independent cause of action. Id. at 377, 320
S.E.2d at 370 (citing 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 68.34(c), and Michael
A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Tort Liability'of Worker's [sic] Compensation Insurer for
Wrongful Delay or Refusal to Make Payments Due, 8 A.L.R. 4th 902 (1981)).
The majority cites and briefly describes Davis but, aside from making a distinction from
Roberts, gives it no further analysis.
117. Dicks, 220 Ga. App. at 729, 470 S.E.2d at 282 (Ruffin, J., dissenting). See

O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-108(b), -221(e) (1992).
118. 220 Ga. App. at 729-30, 470 S.E.2d at 282 (Ruffin, J., dissenting) (citing Bright,
253 Ga. at 381, 320 S.E.2d at 368). The General Assembly frequently examines the Act
and amends it. The "definitions" provision, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1, has been amended some
thirty-eight times since it was first enacted in 1920, including nineteen times since 1980.
The exclusivity provision, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11, has been amended five times in the last
twenty-five years. The temporary total disability section, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261, has
increased the maximum weekly benefit every other year for the past six years. Georgia
courts have consistently held that the exclusive remedy doctrine is strictly within the
legislature's purview. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miniweather, 119 Ga. App. 617,
168 S.E.2d 341 (1969) (The Act is a "complete code" and the courts may "neither rewrite
the law nor hedge it about with restrictions not included in it."); McCormick v. Mark Heard
Fuel Co., 183 Ga. App. 488, 359 S.E.2d 171 (1987) ("lilt is incumbent upon the legislature
to modify the statutory exclusivity feature if it sees fit to do so.") Massey v. Thiokol
Chem. Corp., 368 F. Supp 668, 675 (S.D. Ga. 1973) (Any complaint about the workers'
compensation system "addresses itself to the legislative and not the judicial branch.").
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B. The General Problem with Underminingthe Exclusive Remedy
Doctrine
The Georgia Supreme Court must address the dilemma in the Dicks
decision as it now decides the Doss case. In addition to exploring the
issues specific to Dicks, the court must address the underlying policy
question of whether the exclusive remedy doctrine should remain
intact." 9 Georgia courts and expert commentators maintain that the
"exclusiveness of remedy is a rational mechanism for making the
compensation system work in accord with the purpose of the Act."'" 0
To undermine the exclusive remedy doctrine is to undermine the
workers' compensation system.
The workers' compensation system developed from a bargained-for
exchange between industry and employees: Employees injured at work
receive sure recovery without regard to fault while employers receive
immunity from compensatory and punitive damages. 21 If the extent
of recovery by an employee is the issue, there are other means to accomplish that end without weakening the exclusivity doctrine. 2
Allowing direct tort action between employer and employee undermines the express premise of the original legislative bargain. So long as
the injury is not wholly separate from the employer-employee relationship, the exclusive remedy doctrine must remain intact. Otherwise, one
side of the legislative bargain is undone while the other remains in
force. 123 The delicately balanced quid pro quo imposing no-fault
claims becomes illusory
liability in exchange for immunity from tort
24
without a viable exclusive remedy doctrine.
Workers' compensation will lose its effectiveness as a cost-spreading
mechanism if tort law invades the process. The transaction costs of a
workers' compensation claim from initial reporting through the
administrative courts are lower than those of a tort claim in litigation." 6 Workers' compensation, unlike the tort system, is unfettered

119. For a discussion of previously recognized exceptions to Georgia's exclusive remedy
doctrine, see supra note 41.
120. Massey v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 368 F. Supp. at 676 (citations omitted). See
Epstein supra note 1, at 818; King, supra note 5, at 516.
121. For a complete discussion of the evolution of workers' compensation, see supra
part II.
122. The legislature is in the best position to expand injured employees' recovery. See
supra text accompanying notes 67 and 110.
123. Epstein, supra note 1, at 812. Epstein argues that allowing a tort action and a
workers' compensation claim is beyond rational defense. Id. at 813.
124. ing, supra note 5, at 411-12.
125. Id. at 412.
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by expensive determinations of "fault" or "pain and suffering."2 8 Tort
is regarded as a notoriously inefficient cost-spreading vehicle. 12

7

Most

importantly, workers' compensation has less actual adjudication, thus
allowing more insurance premium funds to reach injured workers."
Much of the stability of the workers' compensation system is grounded
in predictability. Adding bad faith claims to the formula not only adds
to the unpredictability inherent in tort but also makes the avenue of
recovery unclear.'29 Some commentators argue tortious conduct can
be deterred only through tort exceptions to the exclusive remedy
doctrine.' The fundamental flaw in such reasoning is the assumption
that the exclusive remedy doctrine is synonymous with immunity. The
workers' compensation system is a shield only to the extent that it
confines recovery to that provided by the legislature under the Workers'
Compensation Act. So long as the workers' compensation system
requires the employer or insurer to pay some penalty to employees who
suffer injuries due to bad faith, the injury is redressed, the entire case
remains within the workers' compensation system, and the system itself
remains viable. 3 '
VI.

CONCLUSION

Clear precedent and public policy in Georgia mandate support for the

exclusive remedy doctrine in Doss. Penalties for "bad faith" are
available within the Act. If it is the opinion of the court that those
penalties do not deter bad faith, then this issue is within the province
of the General Assembly.132
The Georgia Supreme Court should take the opportunity presented by
Doss to solidify the exclusive remedy provision of the Georgia Workers'
Compensation Act. If an independent cause of action for bad faith is
allowed, the unfounded distinction between physical and financial
injuries will continue. Rather than granting different remedies for the
same culpable conduct, the Georgia Supreme Court should support the

126. See generally Cornelius J. Peck, Compensationfor Pain:A Reappraisalin light of
New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1355 (1974).
127. King, supra note 5, at 412; see Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The
InstitutionalPerspective, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 184 (1987).
128. King, supra note 5, at 412.
129. Id. at 413.
130. See Arthur J. Amchan, "CallousDisregard"for Employee Safety: The Exclusivity
of the Workers' CompensationRemedy Against Employers, 34 LAB. L.J. 683, 686-87 (1983).
131. Epstein, supra note 1, at 814.
132. See Bright, 253 Ga. at 381, 320 S.E.2d at 368; Dicks, 220 Ga. App. at 729-30, 470
S.E.2d at 282-83.
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historical purposes and integrity of the workers' compensation system by
keeping the penalties for all bad faith conduct within the system.1"
POSTSCRIPT
The Georgia Supreme Court answered the question posed in Doss v.
Food Lion"M after the end of this survey period. In a five-page
unanimous opinion, the court held that no cause of action exists for
intentional delay in authorizing medical treatment. After noting that
the Workers' Compensation Act already provides penalties for intentional delays in treatment, Justice Norman S. Fletcher held that the
"exclusivity provision is the bedrock of the workers' compensation
system."135 Any expansion of benefits afforded injured workers must,
according to the court, originate with the legislature. The court then
overruled the court of appeals holding in ZurichAmerican InsuranceCo.
v. Dicks. 36
The court's decision mirrors the authors' analysis by recognizing
remedies within the Act and then speaking to the importance of the
exclusive remedy doctrine. A complete discussion of the court's ruling
in Doss will appear in the Mercer Law Review's 1996-1997 Annual
Survey of Georgia Law.

133. "What is needed is a return to the original conception of the system with its robust
exclusive-remedy provision." Epstein, supra note 1, at 813.
134. 267 Ga. 312, 477 S.E.2d 577 (1996).
135. Id. at 313, 477 S.E.2d at 578.

136. 229 Ga. App. 725, 470 S.E.2d 279 (1996).

